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A Survey of State Fetal Homicide Laws and  
Their Potential Applicability to Pregnant Women  
Who Harm Their Own Fetuses 
ANDREW S. MURPHY* 
[I]f a woman is quick with child, and, by a potion or otherwise, kills it 
in her womb . . . this, though not murder, . . . [is] a heinous 
misdemeanour.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Every year, approximately one million people attempt suicide in the United 
States.2 The vast majority of these individualssome 96% of themsurvive their 
attempts to take their own lives.3 Unsuccessful suicide attempts nonetheless can 
permanently alter the course of an individual’s life, including as a result of serious 
injuries that may have long-term effects on health, financial stability, and general 
well-being.4 Only in rare circumstances, however, do individuals face the risk of 
criminal prosecution for attempting suicide. All fifty states have abandoned the 
common-law practice of criminalizing attempted suicide,5 though it can be 
punished under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.6 Many states also explicitly 
allow for the criminal prosecutions of those who accidentally cause the death of a 
third party while attempting suicide.7 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * J.D., 2013, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., 2009, The University of 
Texas of the Permian Basin. I am very grateful to Professor Dawn Johnsen, whose feedback 
throughout the writing and revising processes has helped me to improve this Comment 
tremendously. I am also grateful to Julie Smith, Farah Diaz-Tello, and Professor Stephen 
Conrad for their thoughts on a preliminary draft of this Comment. Finally, I am grateful to 
the staff of the Indiana Law Journalparticularly to Jim Spangler, Aaron Pettis, and Rich 
Culbertfor their helpful suggestions, and also for their terrific editing and proofreading 
assistance. Any remaining errors or infelicities are my own. 
 1. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129–30. 
 2. See John L. McIntosh & Christopher W. Drapeau, U.S.A. Suicide: 2010 Official 
Final Data, AM. ASS’N SUICIDOLOGY (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.suicidology.org/c
/document_library/get_file?folderId=248&name=DLFE-618.pdf. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See Understanding Suicide, CDC.GOV (2012), http://www.cdc.gov/Violence
Prevention/pdf/Suicide_FactSheet_2012-a.pdf. 
 5. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 774 n.13 (1997) (Souter, J., 
concurring); Thea E. Potanos, Note, Dueling Values: The Clash of Cyber Suicide Speech and 
the First Amendment, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 676–77 (2012). 
 6. See United States v. Caldwell, 70 M.J. 630 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2010) (affirming 
the conviction under 10 U.S.C. § 934 of a soldier who tried to commit suicide by slitting his 
wrists), rev’d on other grounds, 72 M.J. 137 (C.A.A.F 2013) (finding it unnecessary to 
resolve the issue of whether a service member may incur criminal liability on the basis of a 
bona fide suicide attempt alone). 
 7. See John H. Derrick, Annotation, Criminal Liability for Death of Another as Result 
of Accused’s Attempt to Kill Self or Assist Another’s Suicide, 40 A.L.R. 4TH 702 (1985 & 
Supp. 2013). 
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No individual who has survived a recent suicide attempt has been threatened 
with possible criminal penalties greater than those faced by an Indianapolis woman 
named Bei Bei Shuai. In December 2010, Shuai attempted to commit suicide by 
ingesting rat poison.8 Shuai was thirty-three weeks pregnant at the time, and the 
Indianapolis prosecutor eventually charged her with the murder and attempted 
feticide of her then-unborn (but viable) fetus,9 which was delivered via emergency 
caesarian section eight days after Shuai ingested the rat poison.10 Because Indiana 
law presumes bail should be denied in murder cases,11 Shuai spent over a year in 
prison awaiting trial before the Court of Appeals of Indiana decided, on 
interlocutory appeal, that Shuai had offered sufficient evidence to rebut the 
presumption against bail.12 
In the face of tremendous public pressure against the prosecution,13 and after the 
court hearing the case granted Shuai’s motion in limine to suppress evidence 
important to the prosecution’s case, the prosecutor eventually dropped the murder 
and attempted feticide charges against Shuai in exchange for her agreement to 
plead guilty to misdemeanor criminal recklessness.14 For approximately two-and-a-
half years, however, Shuai faced the possibility of spending up to sixty-five years 
in prison for attempting suicide while pregnant,15 even though attempting suicide is 
not in itself a crime in the State of Indiana.16 
Shuai’s case quickly became something of a cause célèbre for public health 
advocates17 and was covered widely by both foreign and domestic media.18 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. Brief of Appellee at 3, Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (No. 
49A02-1106-CR-486) [hereinafter Shuai Appellee’s Brief]. 
 9. For the sake of simplicity, this Commentunless otherwise specifieduses the 
term “fetus” to refer to all stages of prenatal development, including the first two months 
when “embryo” is the correct term. 
 10. Shuai Appellee’s Brief, supra note 8, at 2, 4. 
 11. Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 623 (citing Bozovichar v. State, 103 N.E.2d 680, 683 (Ind. 
1952), abrogated on other grounds by Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. 2013)). 
 12. Id. at 625. To be precise, Shuai spent 435 days in jail before she was allowed to post 
bail. Dave Stafford, The Case Against Bei Bei Shuai, IND. LAW., Aug. 17–30 2012, at 1, 1. 
Shuai’s release predated a 2013 Indiana Supreme Court case that contradicted nearly a 
century and a half of case law by holding that the burden of proving that an individual 
accused of murder should be denied bail must be placed on the State. Fry, 990 N.E.2d at 
433. Presumably, Shuai would have had an easier time obtaining bail had she been arrested 
after June 2013. 
 13. More than 100,000 people ultimately signed a petition on Change.org to “Free Bei 
Bei!” See Protect Pregnant Women: Free Bei Bei!, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org
/petitions/protect-pregnant-women-free-bei-bei. In addition, dozens of medical, public 
health, civil liberties, and reproductive rights organizations have expressed support for her 
cause through amicus curiae briefs that were filed on her behalf in the Court of Appeals of 
Indiana. See infra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 14. Diana Penner, Shuai Freed on Guilty Plea, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 3, 2012, at 
A1; see also infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
 15. See IND. CODE § 35-50-2-3(a) (2008). 
 16. Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 630 (citing Prudential v. Rice, 52 N.E.2d 624, 626 (Ind. 
1944)). 
 17. The following organizations each signed on to one of several amicus curiae briefs, 
submitted to the Court of Appeals of Indiana on Shuai’s behalf: American Association of 
Suicidology, American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Medical 
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Although the circumstances of Shuai’s case were remarkable, she is far from the 
only woman to face the threat of criminal liability for allegedly causing the death 
her fetus. In fact, “[s]ince abortion was legalized in 1973, hundreds of women 
across the country have been arrested for harming their fetuses, with charges 
ranging from child endangerment to first-degree murder.”19 As more states pass 
more laws granting more legal protections to fetuses,20 the potential for fetal rights 
to conflict with maternal rights is likely to increase as well.21 
While any subjugation of maternal rights to fetal rights will necessarily involve 
weighty constitutional and public policy considerations,22 this Comment focuses 
primarily on those statutes that could be used to charge pregnant women with 
various crimes of homicideincluding murder, negligent homicide, and 
manslaughterfor killing their own fetuses. Specifically, this Comment surveys 
the fetal homicide statutes23 of the fifty states and finds that many states do not 
                                                                                                                 
Women’s Association, American Nurses Association, American Society of Addiction 
Medicine, Association of Reproductive Health Professionals, Baron Edward de Rothschild 
Chemical Dependency Institute, Child Welfare Organizing Project, Depression and Bipolar 
Support Alliance, HealthRight International, International Mental Disability Law Reform 
Project, Mental Health America, Mental Health America of Indiana, National Alliance on 
Mental Illness, National Alliance on Mental Illness–Indiana, National Asian Pacific 
American Women’s Forum, National Association of Nurse Practitioners in Women’s Health, 
National Association of Social Workers, the Indiana Chapter of the National Association of 
Social Workers, National Coalition for Child Protection Reform, National Institute for 
Reproductive Health, National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health, National Perinatal 
Association, National Women's Health Network, Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine, the 
Women’s Therapy Centre Institute, Postpartum Support International, Indiana National 
Organization for Women, Law Students for Reproductive Justice, National Women's Law 
Center, SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective, the Indiana Perinatal 
Network, Legal Voice, The MISS Foundation, and Open Arms Perinatal Services. In 
addition, numerous doctors, lawyers, academics, and advocates joined the briefs in their 
individual capacities. 
 18. See, e.g., Ada Calhoun, Mommy Had to Go Away for a While, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 
2012, at MM30; Ed Pilkington, Indiana Prosecutor Accused of Silencing Chinese Woman on 
Murder Charge, GUARDIAN (July 15, 2012, 10:45 AM EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk
/world/2012/jul/15/indiana-abortion; Stafford, supra note 12. 
 19. Calhoun, supra note 18 (emphasis added); see also Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne 
Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–
2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & 
L. 299 (2013) (providing the first ever systematic survey of these sorts of cases). The 
Paltrow and Flavin article “report[s] on 413 cases from 1973 to 2005 in which a woman’s 
pregnancy was a necessary factor leading to attempted and actual deprivations of a woman’s 
physical liberty.” Id. at 299. As the authors explain, however, the 413 cases they analyze 
represent a “substantial undercount” of all such cases. Id. at 303. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. Cf. Lynn Paltrow, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Advocates for Pregnant Women, Reproductive 
Justice and the Indiana Case of Bei Bei Shuai, Address at Indiana University Maurer School 
of Law (Mar. 29, 2013), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_5NPldYYLic, at 
33:55−35:56. 
 22. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women’s 
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 614−15 
(1986). 
 23. For convenience, this Comment refers to all statutes that define embryos and fetuses 
as potential victims of homicide (including feticide) as “fetal homicide statutes.” 
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explicitly exempt pregnant women from homicide prosecution for causing the 
death of their own fetuses. While others have previously surveyed fetal homicide 
statutes in academic articles,24 and various organizations maintain websites that 
monitor changes in the relevant laws,25 these sources generally do not focus on the 
question of whether or not the laws might be used to prosecute pregnant women for 
harming their own fetuses.26 Given that fetal homicide statutes tend to be most 
controversial when applied to pregnant women with respect to their own fetuses,27 
a survey that focuses on that particular controversial application of the statutes is 
warranted. 
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief historical account 
of how fetal protective statutes have developed in this country. Part II discusses 
three prominent casesShuai v. State,28 State v. Ashley,29 and State v. 
McKnight30that illustrate different methods by which pregnant women might 
encounter criminal liability for causing the death of their own fetuses. With the 
context provided by Parts I and II, Part III surveys the fetal homicide laws of the 
fifty states, paying particular attention to whether these statutes are susceptible to 
being interpreted to provide the basis for the prosecution of pregnant women for 
causing the deaths of the fetuses they carry. Part III also discusses some alternative 
ways states might protect fetal life, as well as how the fetal homicide statutes on the 
books relate to the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence. Part IV argues that 
even though fetal homicide statutes should probably not be interpreted as applying 
to pregnant women with respect to their own fetuses, states that have not already 
done so should consider amending their fetal homicide statutes to add an explicit 
“maternal exception.” The Comment concludes with an appendix of state 
authorities recognizing fetuses as potential victims of violent crimes. 
As the cases discussed in Part II demonstrate, courts should avoid interpreting 
state fetal homicide statutes as protecting fetuses from the women who carry them, 
but these cases also indicate that legislative action may be needed in this area 
because litigation has so far proven to be a very unsatisfactory method for 
determining to whom these statutes apply. Even if courts ultimately decide that the 
statutes do not apply to pregnant women who harm their own fetuses, those 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. See, e.g., Sandra L. Smith, Note, Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim? A 
Survey of Current State Approaches and Recommendations for Future State Application, 41 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1845 (2000). 
 25. See, e.g., Fetal Homicide Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx#resources; State 
Homicide Laws That Recognize Unborn Victims, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE (May 24, 
2013), http://www.nrlc.org/federal/unbornvictims/statehomicidelaws092302/. 
 26. See, e.g., Marka B. Fleming, Feticide Laws: Contemporary Legal Applications and 
Constitutional Inquiries, 29 PACE L. REV. 43, 72−73 (2008) (containing a page-and-a-half 
discussion about “The Difficulty of Feticide Legislation that Protects the Fetus from Its 
Mother”); Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate over Fetal Homicide Laws, 67 
OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 734–37 (2006) (containing a three page discussion on “Abortion and 
Maternal Liability Exceptions”). 
 27. See infra Part IV.A. 
 28. 966 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 
 29. 701 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam). 
 30. 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003). 
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decisions will often come far too late to fully protect the rights of women like Bei 
Bei Shuia, who must invest significant time and resources defending themselves 
against the most serious of criminal charges. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FETAL PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION 
For thousands of years, governments have prescribed various punishments for 
causing the loss of a pregnancy, and typically these punishments have been 
substantially less severe than those prescribed for causing the death of those “born 
alive.” For example, as early as the eighteenth or nineteenth century BCE, the Code 
of Hammurabi provided that “[i]f a man strike[s] a free-born woman so that she 
lose[s] her unborn child, he shall pay ten shekels for her loss.”31 A similar 
commandment can be found in the Bible’s book of Exodus.32 While the ancients 
recognized the loss of a pregnancy as a legally cognizable injury, they generally did 
not punish feticide the same as they punished homicide, whichlike many other 
crimeswas usually punishable by death.33 
Consistent with this tradition, the common law of England generally did not 
consider the destruction of a fetus to be homicide.34 According to the so-called born 
alive rule, most famously articulated by Lord Coke in the seventeenth century: 
If a woman be quick with child, and by a Potion or otherwise killeth it 
in her womb; or if a man beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body, 
and she is delivered of a dead child, this is a great [misdemeanor], and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI ¶ 209 (L.W. King trans., Forgotten Books ed. 2007). In 
contrast, if the man caused the death of the woman herself, the attacker’s daughter was to be 
put to death. See id. ¶ 210. 
 32. Exodus 21:22−23 (King James) (“If men strive, and hurt a woman with child, so that 
her fruit depart from her, and yet no mischief follow: he shall be surely punished, according 
as the woman’s husband will lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine. And if 
any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life.”). These two verses have traditionally 
been interpreted as demonstrating that “the fetus did not have the same status as the mother 
in ancient Hebrew law.” Roy Bowen Ward, The Use of the Bible in the Abortion Debate, 13 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 391, 396 (1993) (citing JOHN R. CONNERY, ABORTION: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE 11 (1977)). In the aftermath of Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), some conservative Protestants have interpreted these verses as 
requiring fines for causing premature birth and the death penalty for causing either 
miscarriage or the death of the mother. See, e.g., H. Wayne House, Miscarriage or 
Premature Birth: Additional Thoughts on Exodus 21:22–25, 41 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL 
J. 108, 112 (1978). However, this alternative interpretation seems to have been unconvincing 
to most of those outside the pro-life community. See, e.g., Carlton W. Veazey & Marjorie 
Brahms Signer, Religious Perspectives on the Abortion Decision: The Sacredness of 
Women’s Lives, Morality and Values, and Social Justice, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
281, 296 (2011); Ward, supra, at 396–97. 
 33. See, e.g., Charles F. Horne, Introduction to THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, supra note 
31, at 1 (“[A]ll the heavier crimes [were] made punishable with death.”); Exodus 21:12 
(King James) (“He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely put to death.”). 
 34. See Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or 
Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a 
Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335, 338 (1971), cited with 
approval in Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (Mass. 1984). 
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no murder: but if the child be born alive, and dieth of the Potion, 
Battery or other cause, this is murder: for in Law it is accounted a 
reasonable creature, in rerum natura [in existence], when it is born 
alive.35 
In other words, although the common law sometimes criminally punished those 
that caused the death of “quick” fetuses,36 the common law did not equate feticide 
with murder unless the fetus was born alive and survived independently of its 
mother before succumbing to its prenatal injuries. In part, this is because the 
relatively unsophisticated state of medical technology, until recently, made it 
difficult to prove that the fetus was alive when the accused committed the allegedly 
harmful act.37 Common law jurists were evidently willing to impose misdemeanor 
liability in circumstances in which it was difficult to determine whether a 
defendant’s actions actually caused the death of the fetus, but they refused to 
impose murder liability on a defendant unless the fetus survived long enough for 
the cause of its death to be reasonably clear. Due to a “confluence of earlier 
philosophical, theological, and civil and canon law concepts of when life begins,” 
the common law simply did not impose any punishment on those who caused the 
death of fetuses before quickening.38 
Although the common law embraced the born alive rule for centuries, general 
acceptance of the born alive rule has declined significantly in the last few decades. 
Just thirty years ago, the rule was embraced by every American jurisdiction that 
had considered the question of whether killing a fetus constituted murder.39 In 
1984, however, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts concluded in Commonwealth 
v. Cass that advances in medicine had largely undermined one of the primary 
rationales for the born alive rule.40 Consequently, the court rejected the rule and 
held that, under Massachusetts law, the “infliction of prenatal injuries resulting in 
the death of a viable fetus, before or after it is born, is homicide.”41 Since 1984, 
thirty-six additional states have legislatively defined fetuses as potential victims of 
homicide.42 
After support for the born alive rule began dwindling at the state level, Congress 
in 2004 enacted the so-called Unborn Victims of Violence Act, which amended the 
United States Code and the Uniform Code of Military Justice to “protect unborn 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 50 
(1680). For the definition of in rerum natura, see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 865 (9th ed. 
2009). 
 36. At common law, “quickening” was “[t]he first motion felt in the womb by the 
mother of the fetus, [usually] occurring near the middle of the pregnancy.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 35, at 1367. 
 37. See Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1328 (citing Means, supra note 34).  
 38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132−33 (1973). The Roe Court was most interested in 
the common law’s approach to abortion regulations, but its explanation of why the common 
law did not criminalize the abortion of fetuses before quickening is pertinent to an 
understanding of the common law’s approach to other types of fetal injuries as well.  
 39. See Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1328 n.5. 
 40. See id. at 1328. 
 41. Id. at 1329. 
 42. See infra Part III. 
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children from assault and murder.”43 Among other provisions, the Act provided that 
“[w]hoever engages in conduct that violates [certain enumerated federal statutes] 
and thereby causes the death of, or bodily injury . . . to, a child, who is in utero at 
the time the conduct takes place, is guilty of a separate offense.”44 Although many 
pro-choice groups opposed the Act, fearingperhaps rightlythat it was part of a 
multifront campaign to justify further restrictions on abortion,45 the Act did include 
what might be called a “maternal exception.”46 Specifically, the Act provided that 
“[n]othing in [the Act] shall be construed to permit the prosecution . . . of any 
woman with respect to her unborn child.”47 Thus, as the Act’s alternate title, “Laci 
and Conner’s Law,”48 makes clear, the Act was intended to protect fetuses from 
crimes of violence committed against pregnant women by third parties, not to 
protect fetuses against those who carry them.  
The Unborn Victims of Violence Act, like the 2004 murder case that motivated 
its passage, provided additional motivation for even more states to pass legislation 
protecting fetal life.49 Many of these state statutes, like the federal statute, included 
an express maternal exception.50 However, many states with fetal homicide statutes 
have not explicitly exempted pregnant women from prosecution under the 
statutes.51 As a result, women in some of these states may now be at risk for 
criminal prosecution because some prosecutors have proved willing to advocate for 
a broad interpretation of the statutes.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1841, 10 U.S.C. § 919a (2012).  
 44. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1). 
 45. See, e.g., The So-Called “Unborn Victims of Violence Act” Does Not Protect 
Women or Children, NAT’L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN (Mar. 5, 2004), 
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/issues/unborn_victims_of_violence_act/the_socalled
_unborn_victims_of_violence_act_does_not_protect_women_or_children_1.php; see also 
Joanne Pedone, Note, Filling the Void: Model Legislation for Fetal Homicide Crimes, 43 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 77, 95 (2009) (“Opponents also feared that laws like the UVVA 
would promote the concept of a fetus having its own right to life and health, and, even if they 
did not directly undermine abortion rights, they would at least create situations where the 
government would increasingly interfere with the woman’s freedom to assure the well-being 
of her fetus.”). 
 46. Legislation that would presumably close this exception has been proposed from time 
to time. See, e.g., Sanctity of Human Life Act, H.R. 212, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(3). 
 48. This is a reference to the much-discussed 2004 case in which Scott Peterson was 
convicted in California of murdering his wife, Laci, and her viable fetus. People v. Peterson, 
No. 1056770 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2004). Peterson was convicted on two counts of violating 
section 187 of the California Penal Code, which defined murder as “the unlawful killing of a 
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.” 
 49. Fleming, supra note 26, at 51−52. 
 50. See infra Table 1. Some of the state statutes even incorporated the language of the 
federal Act’s maternal exception. Compare, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80(f) (2007), with 
18 U.S.C. § 1841(c). 
 51. See infra Table 1. 
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II. THREE REPRESENTATIVE CASES INVOLVING PROSECUTIONS OF  
PREGNANT WOMEN FOR CAUSING HARM TO THEIR OWN FETUSES 
Bei Bei Shuai’s prosecution represented “the first time in Indiana’s history . . . 
[that] the State decided to prosecute a woman for murder of her child based on her 
conduct during her pregnancy.”52 However, prosecutors in other states have 
brought various criminal charges against pregnant women for causing harm to their 
own fetuses.53 This Part examines two additional cases that contribute to an 
understanding of how states should (and should not) approach such issues. In State 
v. Ashley,54 the Florida Supreme Court faced a situation somewhat factually similar 
to the Shuai case, but interpreted Florida’s fetal homicide statute as not applying to 
pregnant women with respect to their own fetuses. Both Shuai and Ashley illustrate 
situations in whichin the absence of a maternal exceptionprosecutors might 
attempt to use fetal homicide statutes to impose criminal liability on pregnant 
women who harm their fetuses. The final case discussed in this Part—State v. 
McKnight55—illustrates that fetal homicide statutes are by no means the only tool 
creative prosecutors may use to bring charges against women who engage in 
various self-destructive behaviors during their pregnancies. As explained in Part 
III, all three cases support the argument that courts should not read criminal 
penalties as reaching pregnant women absent express statements to that effect, and 
ideally legislatures should include an explicit maternal exception to prevent 
prosecutors from seeking to use fetal homicide statutes in unintended ways. 
A. Attempted Suicide: Shuai v. State 
In December 2010, Bei Bei Shuai was eight months pregnant with a fetus that 
was the result of a sexual relationship she had with a man named Zhiliang Guan. A 
week before Christmas, Guanwho had previously indicated he was happy about 
Shuai’s pregnancybroke off his relationship with Shuai56 and expressed doubts 
about whether he was responsible for the pregnancy.57 On December 23, Shuai 
“wrote Guan, saying she felt she and the fetus were a burden on Guan, she had 
resolved to kill herself, and she was ‘taking [the] baby . . . with [her].’”58 After 
ingesting multiple packages of rat poison, Shuai called Guan to tell him about what 
she had done.59 She then “laid down to die alone in her apartment.”60 Responding 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (Riley, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). 
 53. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 54. 701 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam). 
 55. 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003).  
 56. Shuai Appellee’s Brief, supra note 8, at 3. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (second alteration in 
original). 
 59. Shuai Appellee’s Brief, supra note 8, at 3. 
 60. Brief of Appellant at 6, Shuai, 966 N.E.2d 619 (No. 49A02-1107-CR-00590) 
[hereinafter Shuai Appellant’s Brief]. 
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to an anonymous tip (presumably provided by Guan), the police went to Shuai’s 
apartment, but Shuai told the police she was fine.61 
When the poison failed to kill her, Shuai went to visit a friend.62 After Shuai 
admitted she had ingested the rat poison, she was taken to the hospital for 
treatment.63 Over the course of the next week, “Ms. Shuai’s mental state stabilized, 
. . . she began to express shock and disbelief at her suicide ideations, and she began 
planning for her child’s future as well as her own.”64 However, on New Year’s Eve, 
one of the doctors attending Shuai “observed . . . an unusual fetal heart rate and 
advised Ms. Shuai that she should agree to immediate caesarean surgery for the 
protection of the anticipated newborn.”65 Shuai consented to the procedure, and the 
doctor delivered a premature infant, whom Shuai named Angel.66 
Angel was immediately transferred to the hospital’s neonatal intensive care unit, 
where it was discovered that her blood would not clot and that she was 
hemorrhaging.67 Angel’s condition steadily declined over the next few days, and 
“[o]n January 3, 2011, Shuai consented to removing [Angel] from life support.”68 
Angel subsequently died of what the coroner’s report described as “intracerebral 
hemorrhage due to maternal [rat poison] ingestion.”69 Shuai was treated in the 
hospital’s psychiatric unit until February 4, 2011.70 
On March 14, 2011, the Indianapolis prosecutor charged Shuai with murder and 
attempted feticide, and Shuai turned herself in that day.71 Shuai filed a motion for 
bail and a motion to dismiss the charges against her, both of which were denied by 
the trial court.72 On August 15, 2011, the Court of Appeals of Indiana agreed to 
hear Shuai’s interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s decision on the two motions, 
and on February 8, 2012, the court issued an opinion reversing the trial court’s 
decision to deny bail to Shuai, but affirming the trial court’s decision to deny 
Shuai’s motion to dismiss.73 This ruling was thus a mixed success for Shuai—it 
allowed her to be released on bail pending trial, but it did not stop the prosecution 
against her. 74 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 622. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Shuai Appellant’s Brief, supra note 60, at 6. 
 65. Id. at 7. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 622. 
 68. Id. at 622–23. 
 69. Id. at 623 (footnote omitted). Shuai contested the reliability of the coroner’s 
conclusion that Angel died of maternal rat poison ingestion and succeeded in convincing the 
judge hearing the case that the coroner’s report should not be admitted at trial. See Charles 
Wilson, Bei Bei Shuai Trial: Rat Poison Link to Newborn’s Death ‘Unreliable,’ Judge Rules, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan 23, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/24/bei-bei-shuai-
pregnant-rat-poison-unreliable-_n_2541222.html. 
 70. Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 623. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at 632. 
 74. See Stafford, supra note 12. Shuai was also required to wear an electronic ankle 
monitor while awaiting trial. See Diana Penner, Shuai Freed on Guilty Plea, INDIANAPOLIS 
STAR, Aug. 3, 2013, at A1. 
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In affirming the trial court’s decision to deny Shuai’s motion to dismiss, the 
appellate court held, among other things, that (1) the murder and feticide statutes 
applied to Shuai, and (2) the common law did not afford Shuai immunity from 
prosecution.75 Regarding the first issue, the court acknowledged that “[t]he question 
whether the murder and feticide statutes can be applied to a woman in Shuai’s 
situation [was] one of first impression in Indiana,”76 but the court ultimately found 
the relevant statutes to be unambiguous and dispositive. The murder statute 
provides that “[a] person who: . . . knowingly or intentionally kills a fetus that has 
attained viability . . . commits murder.”77 Similarly, the feticide statute provides 
that, outside the context of a legal abortion, “[a] person who knowingly or 
intentionally terminates a human pregnancy with an intention other than to produce 
a live birth or to remove a dead fetus commits feticide, a Class B felony.”78 The 
Shuai court found that because nothing in the text of either statute indicates the 
legislature did not intend them to apply to pregnant women who harm their fetuses, 
the State “should be given the opportunity to [prove its case] without the 
intervention of a reviewing court prior to trial.”79 
The court essentially ignored Shuai’s arguments for why the murder statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to her. In a footnote, the court explained: 
As we may resolve the issue based on the plain language of the statute, 
we need not address her constitutional arguments. See Brownsburg 
Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 714 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Ind. 
1999) (“If a statute is unambiguous, then ‘courts must apply the plain 
language . . . despite perhaps strong policy or constitutional reasons to 
construe the statute in some other way.’”) (quoting Brownsburg Area 
Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 943 F. Supp. 975, 986 (S.D. Ind. 
1996)).80 
This explanation makes little sense in light of Shuai’s actual constitutional 
argument. The crux of that argument was that even if the court concluded that 
the Indiana Legislature enacted homicide laws that do apply to a 
pregnant woman and the fetus she carries, those laws would violate 
numerous rights and protections provided to Ms. Shuai by both the 
federal and state constitutions, including rights of due process both as a 
matter of notice and vagueness, privacy, equal protection, and the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.81 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 628–29, 631. The court also held that the information used to 
charge Shuai was not defective and that Shuai was not being improperly prosecuted for 
attempting suicide. Id. at 627, 630. 
 76. Id. at 628. 
 77. IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1(4) (2008). 
 78. IND. CODE § 35-42-1-6 (Supp. 2012). 
 79. Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 629 n.15. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Shuai Appellant’s Brief, supra note 60, at 36. 
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The court’s explanation for why it declined to address these arguments is an 
explanation for why the court rejected Shuai’s interpretation of a supposedly 
unambiguous statute. However, it is not an explanation for why the court declined 
to address Shuai’s argument that the interpretation of the statute the court actually 
chose to adopt rendered the statute unconstitutional as applied to Shuai. 
As to whether Shuai enjoyed a common law immunity from prosecution for 
causing the death of her fetus, the court found that although “[o]ther states have 
advanced this common law immunity for pregnant women, [they] have not cited a 
specific English common law supporting their positions.”82 Consequently, the court 
cited Lord Coke’s articulation of the born alive rule83 for the proposition that 
women at common law did not enjoy complete immunity from prosecutions for 
harm they caused to their own fetuses.84 It therefore rejected Shuai’s argument that 
the legislature would have had to “expressly include pregnant women as possible 
perpetrators in the elements of the murder and feticide statutes” before those laws 
could be applied in such cases.85 
Although the members of the three-judge panel that heard the case unanimously 
agreed that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Shuai’s request for bail, 
Judge Patricia A. Riley dissented from the part of the court’s opinion that affirmed 
the trial court’s decision to deny Shuai’s request to dismiss the charges against her. 
Judge Riley first disagreed with the majority’s opinion that the information used to 
charge Shuai was legally sufficient for that purpose.86 According to Judge Riley, 
because Angel was born alive and because “[t]he State did not present any evidence 
that Shuai did anything to endanger [Angel] after her birth,” “the State [had] failed 
to establish the essential element of that crime, i.e., that [Angel] was a viable 
fetus.”87 
On the attempted feticide charge, Judge Riley concluded: “In light of Indiana’s 
long-standing statutory and case law history, . . . it was never the intention of the 
legislature that the feticide statute should be used to criminalize prenatal conduct of 
a pregnant woman.”88 She warned that the majority’s interpretation of the statute 
“might lead to a slippery slope whereby the feticide statute could be construed as 
covering a full range of a pregnant woman’s behavior.”89 In the end, Judge Riley 
failed to convince the majority, but her dissent was persuasive enough to compel 
the majority to acknowledge that “[a]s illustrated from this panel’s diverging 
opinions, it is possible the language of the statute could lead to many possibly 
absurd outcomes.”90 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 630. The primary authority the court cited for the proposition 
that “[o]ther states have advanced this common law immunity for pregnant women” was the 
Florida Supreme Court’s State v. Ashley opinion. Id.; see infra Part II.B. 
 83. See text accompanying supra note 35. 
 84. See Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 631. 
 85. See id. at 630–31. 
 86. See id. at 635 (Riley, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 87. Id. at 634–35. 
 88. Id. at 635–36. 
 89. Id. at 636. 
 90. Id. at 629 n.15 (majority opinion). 
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After Shuai’s partial success in the Court of Appeals of Indiana, she was 
scheduled for trial in September 2013.91 After the trial court accepted her motion to 
exclude certain evidence important to the prosecutor’s case, however, the 
prosecutor agreed to drop the murder and feticide charges in exchange for Shuai’s 
guilty plea to criminal recklessness, a misdemeanor.92 After accepting her plea, the 
court sentenced her to less than time served.93 
B. Self-Abortion: State v. Ashley 
Another way a pregnant woman might violate state fetal homicide statutes is by 
performingor attempting to performan illegal abortion on herself. The 
somewhat bizarre 1997 State v. Ashley case illustrates this situation. Although the 
facts of this case are quite atypical of most criminal abortion cases, a brief review 
of the case is warranted here because the Florida Supreme Court’s Ashley opinion 
provides support for Judge Riley’s Shuai dissent. 
In Ashley, an unwed teenager named Kawana Ashley, who was between twenty-
five and twenty-six weeks pregnant at the time, shot herself with .22 caliber 
firearm, critically injuring her fetus.94 Unlike Shuai, Ashley did not shoot herself 
because she wanted to end her own life. Apparently, Ashley merely wanted to 
terminate her pregnancy and believed she would be unable to obtain a legal 
abortion.95 In this desire, she was successful. The bullet struck the fetus’s wrist, and 
the fetus died of immaturity fifteen days after being removed during surgery.96 
To be sure, “the concept of a self-induced abortion via .22 caliber bullet is 
dubious in itself and is highly questionable as a procedure intended to be regulated 
by” Florida’s criminal abortion act,97 but Ashley was nonetheless charged with 
alternative counts of felony murder and manslaughter, with Ashley’s alleged 
violation of the criminal abortion act serving as the underlying offense for the two 
charges.98 The trial court dismissed the murder charge against Ashley but allowed 
the State to proceed with the manslaughter charge.99 The District Court of Appeal 
affirmed and certified two questions for review by the Florida Supreme Court: “1. 
May an expectant mother be criminally charged with the death of her born alive 
child resulting from self-inflicted injuries during the third trimester of pregnancy?” 
and “2. If so, may she be charged with manslaughter or third-degree murder, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. Bei Bei Shuai Pleads Guilty in Baby’s Death, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 2, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/02/bei-bei-shuai-guilty_n_3698383.html. Shuai had 
previously filed a petition for transfer to the Supreme Court of Indiana to further challenge 
the legality of the prosecution against her, but the court unanimously denied the petition on 
May 11, 2012. See Shuai v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1035 (table). 
 92. See Bei Bei Shuai Pleads Guilty in Baby’s Death, supra note 91. 
 93. See id. Shuai was sentenced to 178 days time served, see id., but she had previously 
served 435 days in jail while her case was on interlocutory appeal, see supra note 12 and 
accompanying text. 
 94. State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam). 
 95. See id. at 340. 
 96. See id. at 339. 
 97. Id. at 341−42. 
 98. See id. at 339–40. 
 99. See id. at 340. 
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underlying predicate felony being abortion or attempted abortion?”100 The Florida 
Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative, mooting the second 
question.101 
In concluding that pregnant women could not be charged with murder for 
causing harm to a fetus that lives briefly after being born, the Ashley court, unlike 
the Shuai court, accepted the idea that the common law provided women in such 
situations immunity from prosecution. According to a 1904 Connecticut Supreme 
Court case the Ashley court quoted:  
At common law an operation on the body of a woman quick with child, 
with intent thereby to cause her miscarriage, was an indictable offense, 
but it was not an offense in her to so treat her own body, or to assent to 
such treatment from another; and the aid she might give to the offender 
in the physical performance of the operation did not make her an 
accomplice in his crime. The practical assistance she might thus give to 
the perpetrator did not involve her in the perpetration of his crime. It 
was in truth a crime which, in the nature of things, she could not 
commit.102 
In other words, according to the Ashley court, the criminal law has traditionally 
differentiated between acts committed by a third party and acts committed by the 
pregnant woman herself because “the criminal [abortion] laws were intended to 
protect, not punish” pregnant women.103  
Because the court accepted this view that pregnant women enjoyed immunity 
from prosecutions from self-abortions at common law, and because nothing in the 
statutes Ashley was charged under stated unequivocally that the legislature 
intended to alter the common law rule, the court concluded that “the legislature did 
not abrogate the common law doctrine of immunity for the pregnant woman.”104 
However, both the court and even Ashley herself seemed to acknowledge that the 
legislature could have criminalized Ashley’s conduct if the legislature had enacted 
a criminal abortion or fetal homicide statute that unambiguously targeted pregnant 
women who harm their own fetuses (though such statutes would have to satisfy 
constitutional limits, of course).105 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100. Id. at 339. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 340 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Carey, 56 A. 632, 636 (Conn. 1904)). 
 103. See id. at 341 (citing Gaines v. Wolcott, 167 S.E.2d 366, 370 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969)). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 343 (Harding, J., specially concurring). Historically, some American 
jurisdictions did criminalize attempts to obtain an illegal abortion. For example, during the 
nineteenth century, “the legislatures of fifteen states declared that a woman who solicited or 
submitted to an abortion had committed a criminal act. However no reported cases reflect the 
actual enforcement of these provisions against women.” Samuel W. Buell, Note, Criminal 
Abortion Revisited, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1774, 1785 (1991) (footnote omitted). Generally 
speaking, to the extent that the various states criminalized abortion, they focused on the 
culpability of the abortion provider, not the woman receiving the abortion. See id. at 
1783−95. In part, this is because, as a practical matter, “it was a nearly impossible task to 
convict an abortionist without the testimony of the woman.” Ashley Gorski, Note, The 
Author of Her Trouble: Abortion in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Judicial 
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C. Drug Use: State v. McKnight 
For several years, various commentators and medical professionals have warned 
that “prosecuting as child abusers or even murderers the thousands of American 
women who carry pregnancies to term despite their drug addictions not only fails to 
further the states’ goal of protecting fetal health, but also violates the constitutional 
rights of pregnant women.”106 Nevertheless, over the course of the last thirty years, 
hundreds of women, particularly poor women of color, have been civilly confined 
or criminally prosecuted for using drugs during their pregnancies107even though 
a growing body of medical research indicates that drug abuse during pregnancy is 
not as harmful to prenatal development as was once believed.108  
South Carolina has been particularly aggressive at prosecuting women who 
abuse drugs during their pregnancies.109 In 1997, in Whitner v. State, 110 a sharply 
divided (3–2) South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a mother 
who pled guilty to criminal child neglect after she gave birth to a baby with cocaine 
metabolites in its system. In so doing, the court held that “the plain meaning of 
‘child’ as used in [the child endangerment] statute includes a viable fetus,”111 
making it the first state supreme court to uphold a criminal child abuse conviction 
based on a woman’s substance abuse during pregnancy.112 
In 2003, another divided South Carolina Supreme Court (again 3–2) affirmed 
the twenty-year prison sentence imposed on Regina McKnight after she was 
convicted of homicide by child abuse in connection with a stillbirth that was 
attributed to McKnight’s use of crack cocaine during her pregnancy.113 In reaching 
this result, the court specifically held, among other things, that (1) the Whitner case 
                                                                                                                 
Discourses, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 431, 443 (2009). Although Roe v. Wade and its 
progeny have significantly limited the extent to which states may criminalize abortion prior 
to viability, criminal abortion statutes may be constitutional as applied to pregnant women 
who illegally abort their viable fetuses, provided that such criminal statutes do not impose an 
undue burden on women seeking legal abortions. See infra Part III.C. 
 106. Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law by Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the War on 
Reproductive Rights, and the War on Women, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 381, 382 
(2008); see also, e.g., Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of 
Pregnant Women’s Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 214−15 (1989); Lynn M. 
Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALB. L. 
REV. 999, 1044−54 (1999). 
 107. See Ehrlich, supra note 106, at 381−82. 
 108. See id. at 388−89. 
 109. For example, as early as 1988, Charleston obstetrics patients suspected of using 
drugs were routinely subjected to urine tests without their knowledge or consent pursuant to 
a policy developed by a local hospital in collaboration with local law enforcement. Ferguson 
v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70−73 (2001). Those women who tested positive for 
drugs were referred to the authorities for prosecution. Id. at 72−73. The Ferguson Court 
found this practice a violation of the patients’ Fourth Amendment rights against 
unreasonable searches. Id. at 84−86. 
 110. 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997). 
 111. Id. at 785 (emphasis in original). 
 112. See State Policies in Brief: Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST. 
(Dec. 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SADP.pdf. 
 113. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003). To be specific, “McKnight was 
sentenced to twenty years, suspended to service of twelve years.” Id. at 171. 
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had put McKnight on notice that her conduct was proscribed, so the prosecution did 
not violate due process; (2) the prosecution did not violate McKnight’s right to 
privacy; and (3) the twenty-year prison sentence McKnight had received did not 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.114 
In a powerful dissent with which one other justice concurred, Justice James E. 
Moore explained why the majority was incorrect to conclude that the South 
Carolina legislature intended for the state’s criminal child abuse to be applied to 
women like McKnight: 
Once again, I must part company with the majority for condoning the 
prosecution of a pregnant woman under a statute that could not have 
been intended for such a purpose. Our abortion statute . . . carries a 
maximum punishment of two years or a $1,000 fine for the intentional 
killing of a viable fetus by its mother. In penalizing this conduct, the 
legislature recognized the unique situation of a feticide by the mother. I 
do not believe the legislature intended to allow the prosecution of a 
pregnant woman for homicide by child abuse under [the child abuse 
statute] which provides a disproportionately greater punishment of 
twenty years to life. 
 As expressed in my dissent in Whitner v. State, it is for the 
legislature to determine whether to penalize a pregnant woman’s abuse 
of her own body because of the potential harm to her fetus. It is not the 
business of this Court to expand the application of a criminal statute to 
conduct not clearly within its ambit. To the contrary, we are 
constrained to strictly construe penal statutes in the defendant’s 
favor.115 
As Justice Moore pointed out, the majority’s interpretation of the criminal child 
abuse statute is extraordinarily harsh compared with the state’s criminal abortion 
statute. It hardly seems possible that the legislature could have intended for a 
woman who causes the death of her viable fetus through neglect or indifference to 
be punished at least ten times more severely than a woman who intentionally kills 
her viable fetus.116 Furthermore, to the extent there remains any ambiguity with 
respect to the intended applicability of the statutes to pregnant women who cause 
the deaths of their own fetuses, the so-called rule of lenity should require courts to 
resolve that ambiguity in favor of the accused.117  
Five years after affirming Regina McKnight’s conviction, a unanimous South 
Carolina Supreme Court granted McKnight’s request for postconviction relief 
based on ineffective assistance of counsel.118 Although the court found McKnight’s 
attorney’s performance deficient in several respects, the court seemed particularly 
concerned about the fact that McKnight’s attorney had failed to present available 
evidence rebutting the State’s allegations regarding the supposed link between 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. Id. at 168. 
 115. Id. at 179−80 (Moore, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 116. The statute under which McKnight was prosecuted provided for a sentence between 
twenty years and life. Id. at 177 (majority opinion).  
 117. Cf. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971). 
 118. See McKnight v. State, 661 S.E.2d 354 (S.C. 2008). 
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cocaine use and stillbirth.119 However, the court did not address the 
constitutionality of McKnight’s prosecution itself, and the court specifically 
rejected McKnight’s equal protection argument.120 Thus, while the decision seems 
to represent an acknowledgement by the court that drug use during pregnancy may 
not be as harmful to developing fetuses as was once believed,121 the court did not 
actually reverse its earlier decisions regarding the appropriateness of prosecuting 
pregnant women for child abuse when those women cause harm to their fetuses by 
using drugs during their pregnancies. 
In construing its child endangerment statute so broadly, South Carolina has 
become something of an outlier. A number of state supreme courts have explicitly 
held that various criminal statutes do not apply to pregnant women who expose 
their fetuses to controlled substances during pregnancy.122 However, seventeen 
statesArkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, 
Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsinconsider substance abuse during pregnancy child 
abuse for purposes of their civil child welfare statutes, and four statesMinnesota, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wisconsinconsider it grounds for civil 
commitment.123 Additionally, when drug abuse is suspected, several states require 
health professionals to report to the state, test for prenatal drug exposure, or both.124 
In January 2013, Alabama became the second state to explicitly allow pregnant 
drug users to be charged with criminal child abuse when the Supreme Court of 
Alabama affirmed a decision by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, holding 
that a viable fetus is a “child” for purposes of the state’s criminal statute prohibiting 
the chemical endangerment of a child.125 A similar case is also winding its way 
through the Mississippi court system, where Rennie Gibbs faces a “depraved heart 
murder” charge in connection with a stillbirth she had shortly after her sixteenth 
birthday.126 As in the previous cases, prosecutors allege the stillbirth was caused by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 119. See id. at 357−61. 
 120. See id. at 363−65. 
 121. See Lynn Paltrow & Kathrine Jack, Pregnant Women, Junk Science, and Zealous 
Defense, CHAMPION, May 2010, at 30, 30−31. 
 122. See, e.g., State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1225 (Haw. 2005) (manslaughter); 
Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Ky. 1993) (child abuse); State v. Stegall, 
828 N.W.2d 526, 533 (N.D. 2013) (child endangerment); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 713 
(Ohio 1992) (child endangerment). 
 123. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-546.5 (West Supp. 2013); GUTTMACHER INST., 
supra note 112. 
 124. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 112. 
 125. See Ex Parte Ankrom, Nos. 110176 & 1110219, 2013 WL 135748, at *1 (Ala. Jan. 
11, 2013). 
 126. See Gibbs v. State, 2010-IA-00819-SCT (Miss. 2011) (dismissing Rennie Gibbs’s 
interlocutory appeal as improvidently granted); Calhoun, supra note 18. The Supreme Court 
of Mississippi recently affirmed the dismissal of a “fatally flawed” indictment of a woman 
named Nina Buckhalter who was charged with similar conduct as Rennie Gibbs. See State v. 
Buckhalter, 2012-CA-00725-SCT (¶¶ 1, 16) (Miss. 2013), 119 So. 3d 1015, 1019. However, 
the court declined to address the merits of Ms. Buckhalter’s constitutional arguments against 
the prosecution. See id. 
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Ms. Gibbs’s use of crack cocaine during her pregnancy.127 If convicted, Ms. Gibbs 
could receive a life sentence.128 
III. USING STATE FETAL HOMICIDE STATUTES TO PROSECUTE  
WOMEN FOR CAUSING HARM TO THEIR OWN FETUSES 
As the cases discussed above illustrate, some statesdespite the objections of 
the nation’s leading medical associations and public health experts129have used a 
variety of means to prosecute pregnant women who engage in various self-
destructive behaviors during their pregnancies. Most states that have brought 
criminal prosecutions against pregnant women for harming their own fetuses have 
done so under their child abuse or child endangerment laws,130 but the Shuai case 
raises the possibility that prosecutors in other states may try to use fetal homicide 
statutes to prosecute pregnant women who cause the deaths of their own fetuses. 
As the Shuai case also illustrates, the mere fact that prosecutors have not used 
their states’ fetal homicide statutes in precisely that way in the past does not 
provide any guarantee that they will not do so in the future.131 Unless a state’s fetal 
homicide statute contains an explicit maternal exception like that contained in the 
Unborn Victims of Violence Act, a pregnant woman of that state may, like Bei Bei 
Shuai, find herself the subject of a type of prosecution previously unheard of in her 
jurisdictionat least until a court intervenes on her behalf.132 Indeed, some 
prosecutors might be more willing to bring such a prosecution now that they can 
point to the Indiana Court of Appeal’s opinion for persuasive authority for the 
proposition that women like Bei Bei Shuai can be prosecuted under their states’ 
fetal homicide statutes. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. Gibbs, 2010-IA-00819-SCT, ¶ 5 (King, J., objecting to the order with separate 
written statement). 
 128. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-21 (West Supp. 2013). 
 129. See April L. Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration of Pregnant 
Women for the Benefit of Fetal Health, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 147, 154 (2007) (“[T]he 
nation’s leading medical associations, including the American Medical Association, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Public Health Association, have all 
opposed punitive measures against pregnant women who use drugs. Their opposition is due 
in part to their understanding that such measures will deter women from accessing much 
needed prenatal care and that the absence of such care certainly will have deleterious 
consequences for both maternal and fetal health.”). 
 130. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 19, at 321. 
 131. Recall that the prosecution against Bei Bei Shuai represents “the first time in 
Indiana’s history . . . [that] the State decided to prosecute a woman for murder of her child 
based on her conduct during her pregnancy.” Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 634 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2012) (Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). 
 132. Cf. Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 311−12 (Md. 2006) (finding that, in seeking to 
determine whether a woman could be charged with reckless endangerment of a child for 
ingesting cocaine during a pregnancy, “criminal liability would depend almost entirely on 
how aggressive, inventive, and persuasive any particular prosecutor might be”). 
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A. A Survey of State Fetal Homicide Statutes 
Thirty-six states currently have statutes recognizing embryos or fetuses as 
potential victims of homicide and other violent crimes.133 Although criminal 
defendants charged under the statutes have challenged them on a variety of grounds 
(e.g., the fact that the criminal defendant may not have known that the mother was 
pregnant), the courts that have heard challenges to the statutes by third-party 
defendants have generally upheld them.134 Some courts have even upheld the 
application of fetal homicide laws to situations in which criminal defendants 
alleged they acted with the consent of the pregnant woman whose fetus was 
harmed.135 
Although a strong majority of those states with fetal homicide 
statutestwenty-five of themproscribe harming fetuses or embryos at any stage 
of development, some states only apply their fetal homicide statutes to fetuses that 
have reached a certain gestational age.136 California and Virginia only protect 
“fetuses” (as distinct from embryos),137 while other states require that the fetus 
must be “quick” (Michigan, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Washington)138 or “viable” 
(Florida and Maryland).139 “Viability” is also the point at which fetuses are 
protected under Massachusetts common law.140 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. See infra Table 1. The states that have not enacted such laws are Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Wyoming. See id. The District of Columbia does not have 
such a law either. Id. However, some of these states, by operation of their state common law, 
protect viable fetuses and/or fetuses that are born alive. See supra text accompanying notes 40–
41; infra note 225. Some of them also protect fetuses by imposing extra penalties for attacking 
pregnant women. See statutes cited infra notes 174–76 and accompanying text. 
 134. See, e.g., State v. Cotton, 5 P.3d 918, 925 (Ariz. 2000); People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 
886 (Cal. 2004); Brinkley v. State, 322 S.E.2d 49, 53 (Ga. 1984). See generally Douglas S. 
Curran, Note, Abandonment and Reconciliation: Addressing Political and Common Law 
Objections to Fetal Homicide Laws, 58 DUKE L.J. 1107, 1139−41 (2009). 
 135. See, e.g., Mary Beth Hickcox-Howard, Note, The Case for Pro-Choice Participation in 
Drafting Fetal Homicide Laws, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 317, 338−39 (2008) (discussing a Texas 
case in which a man claimed his girlfriend asked him to assault her to end her pregnancy after she 
had been told that her pregnancy was too far advanced for her to be able to obtain a legal abortion). 
 136. See infra Table 1. Some states provide explicitly that the statutes apply “at any stage of 
development,” but a number of states provide that the statutes apply after “fertilization” or 
“conception.” Id. Although the state definitions sometimes differ from the accepted medical 
definition of those terms, see infra note 228, the important point is that most states’ fetal homicide 
statutes protect the unborn at very early stages of development. 
 137. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.2 (2009); 
People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994). Although the plain language of the Virginia 
statute seems to indicate that it only applies during the postembryonic stage of development, 
the statute has not yet been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Virginia. See Ex parte 
Ankrom, Nos. 1110176 & 1110219, 2013 WL 135748, at *21 n.17 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013). 
 138. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.322−.323 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 200.210 (LexisNexis 2012); R.I. GEN LAWS § 11-23-5 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.32.060 (West 2009). 
 139. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.193 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); §§ 782.071, .09 (West 
2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-103 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 40–41. 
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In a few states, the gestational age at which a fetus or embryo is protected 
depends on the specific crime with which the defendant has been charged. 
Although one cannot be prosecuted for homicide in Arkansas for causing the death 
of a fetus before it reaches twelve weeks of development, it appears that one can be 
prosecuted for battering a fetus or embryo during any stage of gestational 
development.141 Similarly, in Indiana, a defendant cannot be prosecuted for the 
manslaughter or murder of a previable fetus, but a defendant can be charged with 
feticide for causing the death of an embryo or fetus during any period of gestational 
development.142 Unlike Indiana, Iowa does not allow a defendant to be prosecuted 
for feticide until the fetus reaches the third trimester, but Iowa does allow one who 
causes “serious injury to a human pregnancy” to be prosecuted regardless of the 
stage of the pregnancy.143 
Like the Federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act, a majority of state fetal 
homicide statutes expressly do not apply to pregnant women with respect to their 
own fetuses.144 For example, the Georgia feticide statute provides that: 
Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to permit the 
prosecution of: (1) Any person for conduct relating to an abortion for 
which the consent of the pregnant woman, or person authorized by law 
to act on her behalf, has been obtained or for which such consent is 
implied by law; (2) Any person for any medical treatment of the 
pregnant woman or her unborn child; or (3) Any woman with respect to 
her unborn child.145 
Twenty-four of the thirty-six states that have passed statutes recognizing embryos 
and fetuses as potential victims of violent crimes have included similar language to 
their statutes expressly exempting pregnant women from being prosecuted for 
causing injury to their own fetuses.146 However, in a few instances, the statutory 
protection such clauses afford to pregnant women may be incomplete. For example, 
while Arkansas expressly exempts pregnant women from being prosecuted for the 
homicide of their own fetuses, the state does not expressly exempt such women 
from prosecution for the battery of their fetuses.147 
Although some states have failed to expressly exempt pregnant women from 
being prosecuted for crimes against their own fetuses, at least a few of these states 
seem to have foreclosed the possibility of such prosecutions because of the way the 
statutes are drafted. For example, the Michigan Penal Code provides that “[t]he 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13) (2006 & Supp. 2013), with § 5-13-201. 
 142. Compare IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (2008) (murder), § 35-42-1-3 (voluntary 
manslaughter), and § 35-42-1-4 (involuntary manslaughter), with § 35-42-1-6 (feticide). 
 143. Compare IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013) (feticide), with 
§ 707.8 (serious injury to a human pregnancy). 
 144. See infra Table 1. 
 145. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80(f) (2007). 
 146. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, and West Virginia. See infra Table 1. 
 147. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13) (2006 & Supp. 2013), with § 5-13-201. 
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wilful killing of an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother of such child, 
which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be deemed 
manslaughter.”148 Since a mother could not be criminally prosecuted for murder if 
she caused her own death through self-injury, the language of the statute would 
seem to imply that it does not apply to pregnant women with respect to their own 
fetuses. For similar reasons, pregnant women probably cannot be prosecuted under 
the relevant Nevada,149 Virginia,150 and Washington151 statutes. 
A number of states—including Indiana,152 Iowa,153 Mississippi,154 Missouri,155 
Rhode Island,156 and Wisconsin157—are simply silent on the issue of whether a 
pregnant woman can be prosecuted for various crimes of violence against their own 
fetuses.158 In addition, while it appears that women in Michigan cannot be 
prosecuted for manslaughter under section 750.322,159 it is less clear whether they 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West 2004). 
 149. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.210 (LexisNexis 2012) (“A person who willfully 
kills an unborn quick child, by any injury committed upon the mother of the child, commits 
manslaughter . . . .”). An unusually determined prosecutor could theoretically argue that the 
statute should be interpreted as allowing prosecutions against women who intentionally kill 
their quick fetuses through self-injury. However, interpreting the statute this way would 
produce an absurd result—a woman would be perfectly free to kill her fetus so long as she 
do so without injuring herself, but would face manslaughter charges if she did happen to 
injure herself in the process. 
 150. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.2 (2009) (“Any person who unlawfully, willfully, 
deliberately, maliciously and with premeditation kills the fetus of another is guilty of a Class 
2 felony.” (emphasis added)). 
 151. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (West 2009) (“A person is guilty of 
manslaughter in the first degree when: . . . He intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn 
quick child by inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child.”); see also supra note 149 
(explaining why a similar statute should not be interpreted as applying to a pregnant woman 
who harms her own fetus). 
 152. See IND. CODE §§ 35-42-1-1, -3, -4, -6 (2008). 
 153. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 707.7, .8 (West 2003 and Supp. 2013). 
 154. See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19, -37 (West 2011). 
 155. Although Missouri law provides that no cause of action shall accrue “against a 
woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to properly care for herself or by 
failing to follow any particular program of prenatal care,” the statute could be interpreted as 
leaving open the possibility that pregnant women could be criminally liable for harming their 
fetuses, at least in situations in which they willfully harm their fetuses. See MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 1.205(4) (West 2000). 
 156. See R.I. GEN LAWS § 11-23-5 (2002). 
 157. Wisconsin does not allow women to be prosecuted under its criminal abortion 
statute, but it is silent with respect to the question of whether a pregnant woman could be 
prosecuted for various other crimes. See infra Table 1. However, in light of the statutory 
protection the women of that state enjoy from prosecutions under the criminal abortion 
statute, interpreting the state’s other statutes as allowing those same women to be prosecuted 
for more serious crimes seems even more unreasonable—and less likely to be advocated 
for—than it is in states without such a statutory exception. However, the McKnight case 
indicates that it is not impossible that the state would adopt a seemingly unreasonable 
interpretation of the statute. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 158. See infra Table 1. 
 159. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West 2004); see also text accompanying 
note 148. 
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can be prosecuted under section 750.323, Michigan’s criminal abortion law.160 The 
fact that some of these states have already brought prosecutions against pregnant 
women for harming their own fetuses161 provides a reason to suspect that 
prosecutors in some of the other states mayrightly or wronglyconsider their 
states’ silence on this issue as providing a basis for arguing that the relevant 
statutes could be applied more broadly than they have been in the past. 
In addition, the statutes of a handful of states seem to expressly authorize 
prosecutions of pregnant women who harm their own fetuses, at least in certain 
situations. Utah provides that “[a] woman is not guilty of criminal homicide of her 
own unborn child if the death of her unborn child: (a) is caused by a criminally 
negligent act or reckless act of the woman; and (b) is not caused by an intentional 
or knowing act of the woman.”162 Although the statute prohibits pregnant women 
from being charged with negligently or recklessly causing the death of their own 
fetuses, the plain language of the statute would seem to allow homicide 
prosecutions of women who intentionally or knowingly cause the death of their 
own embryos or fetuses. Similarly, Oklahoma expressly allows a pregnant woman 
to be charged with homicide if she commits “a crime that caused the death of the 
unborn child.”163 Although this language is somewhat ambiguous, it was apparently 
aimed at allowing pregnant women to be charged when they commit some acts 
outside of legal abortions that lead to the deaths of their fetuses.164 
B. Alternatives to Fetal Homicide Statutes 
Fetal homicide statutes generally recognize embryos or fetuses or both as 
potential victims of violent crimes either by defining them as “persons” for 
purposes of the state’s existing criminal laws or by creating new offenses. There 
are, however, other means by which states can protect fetuses. One alternative 
approachalbeit a rather extreme oneis to enact a state constitutional 
amendment giving the unborn all of the rights and privileges of citizenship from the 
moment of conception.165 These so-called personhood amendments have been 
proposed in many states, but haveso farbeen rejected by the voters of every 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.323 (West 2004) (“Any person who shall 
administer to any woman pregnant with a quick child any medicine, drug or substance 
whatever, or shall use or employ any instrument or other means, with intent thereby to 
destroy such child, unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such 
mother, shall, in case the death of such child or of such mother be thereby produced, be 
guilty of manslaughter.”). Although the Michigan legislature may not have intended for “any 
person” to include the pregnant women to whom the statute refers, it does seem conceivable 
that the statute could be interpreted that way. 
 161. See supra Part II. 
 162. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(4) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 163. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 691 (West 2004).  
 164. See TRENT H. BAGGET, LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 2006, at 10–11, available at 
http://www.digitalprairie.ok.gov/cdm/compoundobject/collection/stgovpub/id/1621/rec/229. 
 165. See generally Valena Elizabeth Beety, Mississippi Initiative 26: Personhood and the 
Criminalization of Intentional and Unintentional Acts by Pregnant Women, 81 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 
55 (2011). 
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state in which the initiatives have appeared on the ballot.166 Additionally, because 
of the obvious conflict between such initiatives and the Supreme Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence,167 one state supreme court has refused to even permit a proposed 
personhood amendment to appear on the ballot.168 
A somewhat less extreme alternative is to recognize fetuses as potential victims 
of crimes, but to impose less substantial penalties when a pregnant woman harms 
her own fetus. For example, New York, a state generally regarded as one of the 
more progressive states when it comes to reproductive rights,169 has two pre-Roe 
statutes making an “unjustified” “self-abortion” a class A or a class B 
misdemeanor, depending on whether the fetus has achieved a gestational age of 
twenty-four weeks.170 According to one commentator: 
With respect to a self-committed abortional act within the 24-week 
period, the most sensible [post-Roe] construction of the [statute]—
though not the literal one, is that such act is not criminal. After the 24-
week period, the woman could be guilty of self-abortion if she did not 
act on the advice of a physician that such act was necessary to preserve 
her life.171 
To be sure, these statutes may be largely a product of their time and seem to 
have been used only a handful of times since 1980.172 Nevertheless, the laws remain 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. See Maya Manian, Lessons from Personhood’s Defeat: Abortion Restrictions and Side 
Effects on Women’s Health, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 75, 79–81 (2013); Grace Wyler, Personhood 
Movement Continues to Divide Pro-Life Activists, TIME (July 24, 2013), http://www.nation
.time.com/2013/07/24/personhood-movement-continues-to-divide-pro-life-activists/. 
 167. See Manian, supra note 166, at 86−89. Although it is true that the Supreme Court 
upheld personhood-type language in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 
(1989), the relevant statute did not actually impose any practical obstacles to a woman’s 
exercise of her right to obtain a legal abortion. Id. at 505−06. 
 168. See In re Initiative Petition No. 395, State Question No. 761, 286 P.3d 637, 637−38 
(Okla. 2012) (holding that a proposed personhood initiative was “clearly unconstitutional 
pursuant to Planned Parenthood v. Casey”), cert. denied, Personhood Okla.v. Barber, 133 
S. Ct. 528 (2012) (mem.). In March 2013, several news outlets reported, somewhat 
misleadingly, that North Dakota had become the first state to enact a fetal personhood 
amendment. See, e.g., Laura Bassett, North Dakota Personhood Measure Passes State House, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 22, 2013, 4:02 PM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2013/03/22/north-dakota-personhood_n_2934503.html. However, the amendment is currently 
pending voter approval in November 2014. See id. If approved, it would be the first such 
amendment successfully enacted into law. See id. 
 169. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. & NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., WHO DECIDES?: 
THE STATUS OF WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 66 (22d ed. 2013), 
available at http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/download-files/2013-who-decides.pdf 
(giving New York a grade of “A-” in its 2013 Report Card on Women’s Reproductive Rights). 
 170. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.50, .55 (McKinney 2009). 
 171. William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.40, at 59, 60 
(McKinney 2009) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 172. See Anemona Hartocollis, After Fetus Is Found in Trash, a Rare Charge of 
Self-Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2011, at A32 (indicating that between 1980 and 2011 only 
five women had been charged for violating one of the statutes). 
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on the books, and one was used as recently as December 2011 to charge a woman 
after her fetus was found in a New York City dumpster.173  
Another way some states seek to protect fetal life is to provide additional penalties 
for causing injuries to a pregnant woman. For example, although Colorado does not 
recognize fetuses as separate victims of violent crimes, Colorado does consider the 
intentional killing of a pregnant woman with the knowledge that she was pregnant to 
be an aggravating factor for purposes of determining whether to impose the death 
penalty on a criminal defendant.174 The state also provides that certain intentional 
crimes against pregnant women must be punished more harshly than would be 
required if the woman had not been pregnant (or if the defendant had lacked 
knowledge of the pregnancy).175 Similarly, an “assault of a pregnant woman resulting 
in termination of pregnancy” is a class A felony in Connecticut, making it the most 
serious assault crime recognized under Connecticut law.176 
This approach is favored by those who fear that “[b]y granting fetuses victim 
status, the UVV and similar state laws sever the interests of fetus and pregnant 
woman, ultimately furthering an agenda of control over women’s bodies and 
lives.”177 This approach also unambiguously excludes pregnant women who harm 
their own fetuses from the class of persons potentially subject to the extra penalties. 
Since a woman could never be prosecuted merely for causing an injury to herself, 
there is no way a woman could be subject to the extra penalties that the state would 
impose upon a third-party attacker. Consequently, pregnant women in states with 
such laws are in no danger of being prosecuted under those laws for harming their 
own fetuses. 
C. State Fetal Homicide Statutes and the Supreme Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence 
Of course, the mere fact that these fetal homicide laws exist does not mean that 
they are enforceable as applied to pregnant women who harm their own fetuses. After 
all, fourteen states have laws providing near total criminal bans on abortion.178 Such 
                                                                                                                 
 
 173. See id. Those charges were ultimately dropped, but not until the woman’s name—and 
the circumstances of her alleged self-abortion—had been widely reported in the mainstream 
media, severely undermining any right to privacy the woman may have had in choosing to 
abort what was likely a previable fetus. See DA Drops Self-Abortion Case Vs. NYC Woman, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 31, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/04/da-drops-self
-abortion-ca_n_1183152.html. 
 174. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (West 2013). 
 175. See id. §§ 18-1.3-401(13), -501(6). 
 176. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a–59c (West 2012). 
 177. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 
IND. L.J. 667, 696 (2006). 
 178. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., supra note 169, at 10. These states are Alabama, 
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, 
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. Although most of these 
criminal bans were enacted before Roe v. Wade, Louisiana’s criminal abortion ban was not 
enacted until 1991. Id. Other criminal bans enacted after Roe have been struck down on 
constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 138−39 (1996) (per curiam) 
(holding that the unconstitutional portion of a Utah statute purporting to ban abortions prior to 
twenty weeks of gestation in all but five enumerated circumstances was severable from a 
similar constitutional provision that applied to abortions after twenty weeks of gestation). 
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laws are clearly unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade179 but might become enforceable 
in the event that Roe is overturned.180 Thus, it is certainly possible that, as a matter 
of state or federal constitutional law,181 some state fetal homicide statutes are 
unconstitutional as applied to pregnant women who harm their own fetuses. 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,182 the Court 
reaffirmed Roe v. Wade’s “recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have 
an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the 
State.”183 But Casey also reaffirmed and even strengthened the “principle that the 
State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the 
health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.”184 
Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court’s current abortion jurisprudence is not 
entirely clear with regard to whether and to what extent it is constitutionally 
permissible for a state to criminally prosecute a pregnant woman for causing injury 
to her own fetus. Casey stands for the proposition that states may not impose an 
undue burden on a woman’s right to obtain a previability abortion from a 
healthcare professional,185 but the Court’s abortion cases do not directly address the 
question of whether a woman has any sort of fundamental right to take actions to 
abort a pregnancy on her own or to take other actions during pregnancy that risk 
harm to the development of the embryo or fetus she carries.186 
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly addressed these issues, 
“self-abortions [are] currently being practiced in the United States,” and “the 
danger they pose to both the women and the fetuses is real.”187 For example, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently heard a caseMcCormack v. 
Hiedeman188involving an Idaho woman who had been charged under Idaho’s 
1973 criminal abortion statute after she used medication purchased over the 
Internet to induce an abortion, due to the high cost of obtaining a legal abortion in 
rural Idaho.189 If convicted, Jennie Linn McCormack faced a possibility of up to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 179. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 180. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., supra note 169, at 10. Indeed, four 
statesLouisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, and South Dakotahave enacted criminal 
abortion bans explicitly contingent upon this eventuality. See id. 
 181. Sixteen statesArkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, 
Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, 
Vermont, and West Virginiahave interpreted their state constitutions as being somewhat 
more protective of abortion rights than the federal constitution. Id. at 29. 
 182. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 183. Id. at 846. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See, e.g., id. at 878 (“As with any medical procedure, the State may enact 
regulations to further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary 
health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a 
woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.”). 
 186. See Suzanne M. Alford, Note, Is Self-Abortion a Fundamental Right?, 52 DUKE L.J. 
1011, 1012 (2003). 
 187. Id. For example, recall that Kawana Ashley shot herself for the express purpose of 
inducing an abortion. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
 188. 694 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 189. Id. at 1007–08. 
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five years of imprisonment for violating the statute.190 However, the court found, 
among other things, that the statute imposed an undue burden on McCormack’s 
right to have an abortion.191 
Although the McCormack court stated in dicta that the Supreme Court’s 
abortion cases “in no way recognize, permit, or stand for the proposition that a state 
may prosecute a pregnant woman who seeks an abortion in a manner that may not 
be authorized by the state’s statute,”192 the court cited a number of specific factors 
that contributed toward its finding that the law violated Casey’s undue burden test. 
These included (1) the fact that the statute required women to “police their 
provider’s compliance with Idaho’s regulations” in order to avoid criminal 
liability,193 (2) the fact that the FDA-approved medicine used to induce the abortion 
had been prescribed by a physician,194 and (3) the fact that it would have been quite 
difficult for McCormack to obtain a legal abortion.195 
The McCormack case indicates that state laws imposing criminal liability on 
pregnant women for causing harm to their own fetuses may violate Casey’s undue 
burden test, and this analysis presumably applies to so-called fetal homicide 
statutes just as it does to criminal abortion statutes. It seems plausible to think that 
the court might have reached a different result under a different set of facts, 
particularly if the statute had only placed restrictions on McCormack’s ability to 
“self-abort” a viable fetus. Because states have a compelling interest in promoting 
the life or potential life of the unborn and also in protecting the health of pregnant 
women,196 imposing criminal liability on pregnant women who terminate their 
fetuses without obtaining a legal abortion may be consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s abortion jurisprudence in certain situationsparticularly once the fetuses 
obtain viability. However, as will be explained below, state legislators should be 
wary about exercising any constitutional authority they may have to punish 
pregnant women who harm their own fetuses at any stage of pregnancy. 
IV. A CALL FOR REFORM 
The proliferation of state fetal homicide statutes indicates that the statutes are 
generally popular due to widespread condemnation of violence against pregnant 
women.197 Most women who lose pregnancies due to the actions of third parties 
feel, understandably, that they have suffered a serious wrong, and when these 
statutes are used as intended, there is no danger that the statutes could be used to 
infringe upon the reproductive rights of the pregnant women the statutes were 
designed to protect.198 
                                                                                                                 
 
 190. See id. at 1007. 
 191. See id. at 1014. 
 192. Id. at 1013. 
 193. Id. at 1015. 
 194. Id. at 1018. 
 195. Id. at 1017. 
 196. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (O’Connor, 
Kennedy & Souter, JJ.). 
 197. See Curran, supra note 134, at 1119. 
 198. Cf. Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing 
Women’s Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 580−81 (1992) (“Traditionally, the law did not treat 
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However, when state fetal homicide statutes are used to prosecute the very 
women they were designed to protect, the statutes raise serious constitutional and 
public policy concerns. Furthermore, the consensus among medical experts is that 
the best way to protect fetal life is to provide pregnant women with treatment, not 
punishment, when they engage in self-destructive or risky behaviors that ultimately 
put their fetuses at risk.199 Consequently, courts should be quick to grant motions to 
dismiss such prosecutions, and state legislators who have not done so should 
seriously consider adding language to their state’s fetal homicide statutes clarifying 
that the statutes do not apply to pregnant women who harm their own fetuses. 
A. Why Fetal Homicide Statutes Should Not Be Used to Prosecute  
Pregnant Women Who Harm Their Own Fetuses 
As the public outcry that has erupted over the Shuai case indicates,200 many 
people who might otherwise support fetal homicide statutes feel strongly that it is 
inappropriate to use such statutes to prosecute pregnant women who harm their 
own fetuses. Further, not only pro-choice and women’s rights advocates but some 
pro-life groups have joined medical and public health associations in expressing 
concerns about the unintended consequences of interpreting the statutes too 
broadly.201 Even if one believes it is morally wrong for a woman to harm her own 
fetus, there are several reasons why one might also believe it is unwise to prosecute 
such a woman for murder under existing fetal homicide statutes. 
Among women who know they are pregnant, the miscarriage rate is about 
fifteen to twenty percent, and it is often difficult to determine with certainty what 
caused a particular miscarriage.202 As a result, the criminal justice system would 
often encounter difficulties in reliably determining whether a miscarriage is the 
result of a specific action by a pregnant woman that is worthy of criminal 
penalty.203 It may sometimes be difficult to determine whether the actions of a third 
party caused a miscarriage, but in the typical case involving a violent attack on a 
pregnant woman, the connection between the third party’s actions and the fetal 
harm is usually pretty obvious. By way of contrast, because many miscarriages 
cannot be attributed to a particular cause,204 prosecuting a pregnant woman for 
                                                                                                                 
the fetus as a separate entity in contexts that would create an adversarial relationship 
between a pregnant woman and the fetus within her. Rather, the law recognized the fetus as a 
legal entity only for carefully defined purposes, with a view toward protecting and 
promoting the interests of women as well as their children.”). 
 199. See, e.g., Brief Submitted in Support of Appellant Bei Bei Shuai by Amici Curiae 
Am. Ass’n of Suicidology et al. at 18−22, Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2012) (No. 49A02-1106-CR-486), 2011 WL 3892890 [hereinafter Shuai AAS Brief]. 
 200. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 201. See Eleanor J. Bader, Criminalizing Pregnancy: How Feticide Laws Made Common 
Ground for Pro- and Anti-Choice Groups, TRUTHOUT (June 14, 2012, 11:18 AM), 
http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/9772-criminalizing-pregnancy-how-feticide-laws-made
-common-ground-for-pro-and-anti-choice-groups. 
 202. See Miscarriage, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article
/001488.htm (last updated Oct. 31, 2013). “A miscarriage is the spontaneous loss of a fetus 
before the 20th week,” while the loss of a pregnancy after that point is a “preterm delivery.” 
Id. Accordingly, the statistic above describes losses of preterm fetuses only. 
 203. See Beety, supra note 165, at 61−62. 
 204. See id. 
2014] SURVEY OF STATE FETAL HOMICIDE LAWS 873 
 
allegedly causing her own miscarriage runs a substantial risk of punishing her for 
an act outside her control. Given this risk and the severe emotional distress many 
women experience after a miscarriage,205 it seems insensitive to even investigate 
whether a woman did something to cause her miscarriage. 
Applying fetal homicide statutes to pregnant women who harm their own fetuses 
also fails to distinguish a violent attack against a pregnant woman from the actions 
of the pregnant woman herself.206 This distinction is important because “[t]he 
woman has a constitutionally protected right to bodily autonomy, but the third party 
has no right to terminate the woman’s pregnancy.”207 Reasonable minds may 
disagree regarding whether a woman who intentionally causes the death of a fetus 
deserves criminal punishment, but in light of these constitutional and policy 
considerations, it would seem that the pregnant woman, at a minimum, is less 
deserving of punishment than the third party. Consequently, it makes little sense to 
charge both the pregnant woman and the third party attacker with the same offense. 
In addition, applying fetal homicide statutes to pregnant women with respect to 
their own fetuses “raises a number of policy, social, moral, and legal implications” 
and “under our form of government, the appropriate place for those issues to be 
resolved is in the legislature.”208 However, these special concerns were not resolved 
by the legislatures that passed the existing fetal homicide statutes because the fetal 
homicide statutes were generally enacted to protect pregnant women from crimes 
of violence, not to protect fetuses from the women who bear them.209 Indeed, given 
the widespread popular support for both fetal homicide statutes and continued 
access to abortion,210 it is entirely possible that some of the existing fetal homicide 
statutes would not have been enacted if it had been known at the time that they 
could be used to prosecute pregnant women with respect to their own fetuses.211 To 
the extent that state legislators believe it is appropriate to impose criminal liability 
on pregnant women who harm their own fetuses, they should say so explicitly so 
that opponents of such a policy have an opportunity to raise their concerns. 
Most importantly, perhaps, the consensus of medical and public health 
associations is that pregnant women who engage in self-destructive behavior 
should receive treatment, not punishment. To the extent such punishments are 
intended to protect unborn life, they actually have the opposite effect. As dozens of 
medical organizations and individual doctors explained in amicus briefs they filed 
on Shuai’s behalf in the Court of Appeals of Indiana: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 205. In one influential study, “[20%] of the patients who had miscarried showed a grief 
reaction, 12% showed a depressive reaction, and 20% responded with a combined depressive 
and grief reaction.” Manfred Beutel, Rainer Deckardt, Michael von Rad & Herbert Weiner, 
Grief and Depression After Miscarriage: Their Separation, Antecedents, and Course, 57 
PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 517, 517 (1995). 
 206. See Ramsey, supra note 26, at 765−68. 
 207. Alison Tsao, Note, Fetal Homicide Laws: Shield Against Domestic Violence or 
Sword to Pierce Abortion Rights?, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 459 (1998). 
 208. State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 343 (Fla. 1997) (Harding, J., specially concurring). 
 209. See text accompanying supra note 197. 
 210. See Ramsey, supra note 26, at 725, 729−30. 
 211. See Smith, supra note 24, at 1876−77. 
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 When prosecutors adopt a policy of criminal punishment for 
pregnant women whose actions are believed to threaten fetal welfare, 
the prosecutors actually make it less likely that fetal welfare will be 
promoted. . . . Severely depressed women in Indiana now know that if 
their physician or other health care provider finds out about any 
behavior that might be construed as a suicide attempt, they could be 
charged with attempted homicide or attempted feticide. . . . If trying to 
commit suicide can trigger criminal charges because of the potential for 
harm to the fetus, so can drinking alcohol or using other drugs. Instead 
of getting care for their alcoholism or drug addiction, pregnant women 
will try to avoid detection by physicians or other health care providers. 
As a result, physicians, nurses, psychologists and others are less able to 
provide the kinds of treatment that could address the woman’s medical 
condition and help avert fetal harm.212 
These harmful effects are not theoretical: in South Carolina, infant mortality has 
increased in the years following Whinter v. State, when the South Carolina 
Supreme Court first held that women who use drugs during pregnancy can be 
charged with criminal child abuse.213 
Similarly, using fetal homicide statutes to prosecute pregnant women who harm 
their own fetuses could create perverse incentives for those women to abort 
unwanted pregnancies to avoid criminal prosecution.214 If pregnant women who are 
addicted to drugs and alcohol know that they can be prosecuted for fetal homicide 
or attempted fetal homicide, they will have to choose between having an abortion 
and risking criminal prosecution.215 Those who support prosecutions against 
women like Regina McKnight probably do not intend to encourage these women to 
obtain abortions, but that is the likely unintended result of imposing severe criminal 
liability on women who might otherwise seek treatment for their drug and alcohol 
abuse. 
B. Why It Is Important for Fetal Homicide Statutes to Contain Explicit Maternal 
Exceptions Notwithstanding the Fact That Any Ambiguity in the Statutes Should Be 
Resolved in Favor of Pregnant Women Charged Under the Statutes 
Although pro-choice groups have tended to oppose fetal homicide statutes,216 
some commentators have argued that this approach is mistaken: “[I]nstead of 
opposing fetal homicide laws, pro-choice groups should work to ensure that 
proposed fetal homicide laws have adequate exemptions for abortion, because 
poorly written fetal homicide laws are far more threatening to the right to choose 
                                                                                                                 
 
 212. See Shuai AAS Brief, supra note 199, at 20–21 (emphasis in original) (footnote 
omitted). 
 213. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists Comm. on Ethics, Comm. Op. No. 321, 
Maternal Decision Making, Ethics, and the Law, 106 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1127, 
1134 (1995). See generally text accompanying supra notes 109−11 (describing Whitner). 
 214. See Shuai AAS Brief, supra note 199 (citing AMA Bd. of Tr., Legal Interventions 
During Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2663, 2667 (1990)). 
 215. See id. 
 216. See, e.g., NAT’L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, supra note 45. 
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than are well-designed fetal homicide laws.”217 Particularly in light of prosecutions 
of women like Bei Bei Shuai,218 it seems critical that those who oppose such 
prosecutions not simply oppose the enactment of fetal homicide statutes, but 
engage with their proponents to ensure any law enacted is not susceptible to use by 
prosecutors against women for actions during pregnancy that may harm embryonic 
or fetal development. 
To the extent that state legislators did not intend for their states’ fetal homicide 
statutes to be used against pregnant women with respect to their own fetuses, it may 
make sense for them to resolve any ambiguity in the statutes legislatively before the 
courts attempt to resolve that ambiguity on their own. At the very least, legislators 
in states that may enact such statutes in the future should take care in how they 
draft the statutes. As the cases discussed in this Comment illustrate, even if 
prosecutions against women like Bei Bei Shuai are ultimately unsuccessful, the 
prosecutions themselves infringe upon the liberty of the women involved.219 Shuai 
spent over a year in prison before she was convicted of anything.220 Although it is 
not uncommon for persons accused of murder to be incarcerated pending trial,221 
Shuai’s pretrial detention was especially problematic due to the strong 
constitutional arguments in support of the proposition that what she was accused of 
doing was no crime at all. 
Further, even though the murder charges against Shuai were ultimately dropped, 
her privacy was severely invaded by the prosecution and the worldwide coverage it 
received.222 The case generated a huge amount of legal fees as well. The lawyers 
representing Shuai donated over two million dollars in pro bono legal work to 
Shuai’s defense.223 Shuai did not bear those costs directly, but she certainly had to 
contribute a significant amount of her time and energy helping to prepare an 
adequate defense. Given that prosecutors who have brought charges against 
pregnant women for harming their own fetuses have tended to disproportionately 
target poor women of color,224 it is also unlikely that many women targeted for 
such prosecutions would be able to mount the type of sophisticated legal defense 
that eventually succeeded in obtaining a dismissal of the murder and feticide 
charges against Shuai. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 217. Hickcox-Howard, supra note 135, at 322. 
 218. See supra Part II.A. 
 219. See Johnsen, supra note 198, at 600 (“In the Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. 
Pellegrini, the court described the level of governmental intrusion into a woman’s life 
entailed by such a prosecution: ‘In order to prosecute Ms. Pellegrini, the commonwealth 
must intrude into her most private areas, her inner body.’ It also noted that ‘the level of state 
intervention and control over a woman’s body required by the prosecution’ would set a 
dangerous precedent for numerous other pregnancy related restrictions on women.”) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 6, 9 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990), rev’d, 608 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1993)). 
 220. See supra Part II.A. 
 221. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra text accompanying note 18. 
 223. Dave Stafford, Shuai Case Resolved, Thorny Legal Issues Remain, IND. LAW., Aug. 
14–27, 2013, at 1. 
 224. See Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 19, at 311. 
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CONCLUSION 
Prosecuting pregnant women for harming their own fetuses raises serious 
constitutional questions, and it is bad public policy because it actually undermines 
the goal of protecting fetal life. Although it seems likely that such prosecutions will 
be rare, the prosecutions will profoundly affect the lives of women unfortunate 
enough to be targeted for them. Judges hearing such cases should be quick to 
dismiss them, but state legislators can protect women like Shuai from such 
prosecutions by resolving any ambiguity in the intended scope of the statutes. As 
cases from Alabama and South Carolina illustrate, such legislation would need to 
cover all of the potentially relevant statutes to avoid merely redirecting 
prosecutorial attention to different statutes. Nevertheless, a maternal exception like 
the kind included in many fetal homicide laws likely would have prevented the 
Indianapolis prosecutor from charging Bei Bei Shuai. Therefore, to the extent that 
state legislators did not intend for their state fetal homicide statutes to allow for 
prosecutions of women in Shuai’s situation, those legislators that have not done so 
should consider adding language to their fetal homicide statutes clarifying that they 
do not apply to pregnant women with respect to their own fetuses. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. State Authorities Recognizing Fetuses as Potential Victims of Violent Crimes225 
 
 
 
State 
 
 
 
Authorities 
Gestational 
Age Required 
Maternal 
Exception? 
  
Alabama 
 
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1(a)(3) (LexisNexis 
2005) (defining “person” as including 
the unborn for purposes of the state’s 
murder, manslaughter, criminally 
negligent homicide, and assault statutes). 
Any stage of 
development 
Yes 
  
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.150 (LexisNexis 
2012) (murder of an unborn child); 
§ 11.41.160 (manslaughter of an unborn 
child); § 11.41.170 (criminally negligent 
homicide of an unborn child); 
§ 11.41.180 (applicability); § 11.41.280 
(assault of an unborn child in the first 
degree); § 11.41.282 (assault of an 
unborn child in the second degree); 
§ 11.81.900(b)(62) (definitions). 
Any stage of 
development 
Yes 
  
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1101 (West 
2010) (definitions); § 13-1102 (negligent 
homicide); § 13-1103 (manslaughter); 
§ 13-1104 (second-degree murder); 
§ 13-1105 (first-degree murder). 
Any stage of 
development 
Yes 
  
Arkansas ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-102(13) (2006 & 
Supp. 2013) (defining “person” and 
“unborn child” for purposes of the 
state’s capital murder, first-degree 
murder, second-degree murder, 
manslaughter, and negligent homicide 
statutes); § 5-13-201 (battery in the first 
degree). 
Twelve weeks 
for the 
homicide 
statutes; none 
provided for 
battery 
Yes for the 
homicide 
statutes; none 
provided for 
battery 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 225. This table surveys those state criminal statutes that define fetuses as a potential 
victim of a violent crime. It does not include every state law governing the legal rights of 
fetuses, nor does it necessarily include every state statute proscribing punishments for 
violent crimes that result in fetal harm. For example, it does not include those statutes that 
provide extra penalties for crimes of violence committed against pregnant victims. See, e.g., 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-401(13)(a) (West 2013) (providing a certain range of 
punishments for crimes of violence if “(I) [t]he victim of the offense was pregnant at the 
time of commission of the offense; and (II) [t]he defendant knew or reasonably should have 
known that the victim of the offense was pregnant.”). Because such statutes recognize the 
pregnant woman herself—and not her fetus—as the victim of the offense, no pregnant 
woman could possibly be prosecuted under such a statute for harming her own fetus. For 
similar reasons, this table does not survey cases from those states that still adhere to the born 
alive rule. See, e.g., State v. Courchesne, 998 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2010). At least in modern times, 
the born alive rule has never been interpreted as applying to pregnant women with respect to 
their own fetuses because doing so would create a very bizarre situation: a woman could 
avoid criminal prosecution entirely if she made sure the fetus died before birth, but she might 
be charged with murder if she allowed her doctors to do what they could to save the fetus.  
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
 
State 
 
 
State Authorities Recognizing Fetuses 
as Potential Victims of Violent Crimes 
Gestational 
Age Required 
Maternal 
Exception? 
  
California CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2008) 
(defining murder as “the unlawful killing 
of a human being, or a fetus, with malice 
aforethought”). 
Post-
embryonic226 
Yes 
  
Colorado None — — 
  
Connecticut None — — 
  
Delaware None — — 
  
District of 
Columbia 
None — — 
  
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.193 (West 2006 
& Supp. 2013) (DUI manslaughter); 
§ 782.071 (West 2007) (vehicular 
homicide); § 782.09 (murder & 
manslaughter). 
Viability Yes for 
manslaughter; 
implied for the 
others227 
  
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-20 (2007) 
(simple assault); § 16-5-28 (assault of an 
unborn child); § 16-5-29 (battery of an 
unborn child); § 16-5-80 (feticide and 
voluntary manslaughter of an unborn 
child); § 40-6-393.1 (feticide by 
vehicle); § 52-7-12.3 (West, 
WestlawNext through 2013 reg. sess.) 
(feticide by vessel). 
Any stage of 
development  
Yes 
  
Hawaii None — — 
  
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (2004) 
(murder); § 18-4006 (Supp. 2013) 
(manslaughter); § 18-4016 (2004) 
(definitions). 
In utero Yes 
  
Illinois 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-1.2 
(West Supp. 2013) (intentional homicide 
of an unborn child); § 5/9-2.1 (West 
2002) (voluntary manslaughter of an 
unborn child); § 5/9-3.2 (involuntary 
manslaughter and reckless homicide of 
an unborn child); § 5/12-3.1 (West Supp. 
2013) (battery and aggravated battery of 
an unborn child). 
Post-
fertilization 
Yes 
 
  
    
    
    
    
                                                                                                                 
 
 226. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994). 
 227. Additionally, in light of the Florida Supreme Court’s Ashley decision, it seems 
highly unlikely that the court would interpret these statutes as applying to pregnant women 
with respect to their own fetuses, even if the statutes were somewhat ambiguous on that 
point. See supra Part II.B. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
 
State 
 
 
State Authorities Recognizing Fetuses 
as Potential Victims of Violent Crimes 
Gestational 
Age Required 
Maternal 
Exception? 
  
Indiana IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (2008) (murder); 
§ 35-42-1-3 (voluntary manslaughter); 
§ 35-42-1-4 (involuntary manslaughter) 
§ 35-42-1-6 (feticide). 
Manslaughter 
and murder 
require 
viability; 
feticide 
requires only a 
pregnancy 
No 
  
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 2003 & 
Supp. 2013) (feticide); § 707.8 (2003) 
(serious injury to a human pregnancy). 
Third trimester 
for feticide; 
injury to a 
pregnancy 
requires only a 
pregnancy 
No for 
feticide; yes 
for injury to 
pregnancy 
  
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5419 (Supp. 
2012) (defining an “unborn child” as a 
potential victim of capital murder, first-
degree murder, second-degree murder, 
voluntary manslaughter, involuntary 
manslaughter, vehicular homicide, and 
battery). 
Post-
fertilization 
Yes 
  
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.010 
(LexisNexis 2008) (definitions); 
§ 507A.020 (first-degree fetal 
homicide); § 507A.030 (second-degree 
fetal homicide); § 507A.040 (third-
degree fetal homicide); § 507A.050 
(fourth-degree fetal homicide). 
Conception228 Yes 
  
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2 (Supp. 
2013) (“unborn child”); § 14:32.5 
(2007) (definition of feticide); § 14:32.6 
(first-degree feticide); § 14:32.7 
(second-degree feticide); § 14:32.8 
(Supp. 2013) (third-degree feticide). 
Fertilization and 
implantation 
Yes 
  
Maine None — — 
  
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-103 
(LexisNexis 2012) (defining “viable 
fetuses” as potential victims of murder 
and manslaughter). 
Viability Yes 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 228. The Kentucky statute provides that the term “‘[u]nborn child’ means a member of 
the species homo sapiens in utero from conception onward, without regard to age, health, or 
condition of dependency.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.010(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2008). The 
statute seems to use “conception” as a synonym for “fertilization.” However, this definition 
of “conception” is contrary to the medical definition of the term, which defines it as a 
synonym for “implantation.” See Johnsen, supra note 106, at 182 n.13 (citing OBSTETRIC-
GYNECOLOGIC TERMINOLOGY 229, 327 (Edward C. Hughes ed., 1972)). Many of the statutes 
surveyed in this Appendix also create a legal definition of “conception” that is at odds with 
the medical definition of the word. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
 
State 
 
 
State Authorities Recognizing Fetuses 
as Potential Victims of Violent Crimes 
Gestational Age 
Required 
Maternal 
Exception? 
  
Massachusetts Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 
N.E.2d 571, 571 (Mass. 1989) (holding 
that a viable fetus is considered a human 
being for purposes of common law 
murder); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 
N.E.2d 1324, 1324 (Mass. 1984) 
(holding that a viable fetus is considered 
a person for purposes of the state’s 
vehicular homicide statute). 
 
Viability No 
  
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 
(West 2004) (criminalizing willful 
killing of unborn child by injury to the 
mother); § 750.323 (death of unborn 
child by use of medicine or instrument). 
Quickening No for death 
of unborn 
child by use 
of medicine; 
implied for 
willful killing 
by injury to 
mother 
  
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.21 (West 
2009) (criminal vehicular homicide and 
injury); § 609.266 (definitions); 
§ 609.2661 (murder of unborn child in 
the first degree); § 609.2662 (murder of 
unborn child in the second degree); 
§ 609.2663 (murder of unborn child in 
the third degree); § 609.2664 
(manslaughter of unborn child in the 
first degree); § 609.2665 (manslaughter 
of unborn child in the second degree); 
§ 609.267 (assault of unborn child in the 
first degree); § 609.2671 (assault of 
unborn child in the second degree); 
§ 609.2672 (assault of unborn child in 
the third degree); § 609.268 (injury or 
death of unborn child in commission of 
crime). 
Conception Yes 
  
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (West 
2011) (defining an “unborn child” as a 
potential victim of murder); § 97-3-37 
(defining an “unborn child” as a 
potential victim of numerous 
enumerated crimes of violence). 
Any stage of 
development 
No 
  
Missouri MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000) 
(granting the “unborn child” “all the 
rights, privileges, and immunities 
available to other persons, citizens, and 
residents”).229 
Conception No 
                                                                                                                 
 
 229. This statute is clearly unconstitutional to the extent that it conflicts with the Supreme 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
 
State 
 
 
State Authorities Recognizing Fetuses 
as Potential Victims of Violent Crimes 
Gestational Age 
Required 
Maternal 
Exception? 
  
Montana None — — 
  
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-389 
(LexisNexis 2009) (definitions); 
§ 28-390 (applicability); § 28-391 
(murder of an unborn child in the first 
degree); § 28-392 (murder of an unborn 
child in the second degree); § 28-393 
(manslaughter of an unborn child); 
§ 28-394 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 
2013) (motor vehicle homicide of an 
unborn child); § 28-397 (LexisNexis 
2009) (assault of an unborn child in the 
first degree); § 28-398 (assault of an 
unborn child in the second degree); 
§ 28-399 (assault of an unborn child in 
the third degree). 
Any stage of 
development 
Yes 
  
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.210 
(LexisNexis 2012) (willful killing of 
unborn child). 
Quickening Implied 
  
New 
Hampshire 
None — — 
  
New Jersey None — — 
  
New Mexico None — — 
  
New York None — — 
  
North 
Carolina 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-23.1 
(definition of “unborn child”) (West 
Supp. 2012); § 14-23.2 (murder of an 
unborn child); § 14-23.3 (voluntary 
manslaughter of an unborn child); 
§ 14-23.4 (involuntary manslaughter of 
an unborn child); § 14-23.5 (assault 
inflicting serious bodily injury on an 
unborn child); § 14-23.6 (battery on an 
unborn child); § 14-23.7 (applicability). 
Any stage of 
development 
Yes 
  
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-01 (2012) 
(definitions); § 12.1-17.1-02 (murder of 
an unborn child); § 12.1-17.1-03 
(manslaughter of an unborn child); 
§ 12.1-17.1-04 (negligent homicide of 
an unborn child). 
Conception Yes 
    
    
    
    
                                                                                                                 
Court’s abortion jurisprudence. Although this statute was the subject of Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services, the Supreme Court expressly declined to rule on the statute’s 
constitutionality. See 492 U.S. 490, 505−06 (1989); see also supra note 167 and 
accompanying text. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
 
State 
 
 
State Authorities Recognizing Fetuses 
as Potential Victims of Violent Crimes 
Gestational Age 
Required 
Maternal 
Exception? 
  
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 
(LexisNexis 2010) (aggravated murder); 
§ 2903.02 (murder); § 2903.03 
(voluntary manslaughter); § 2903.04 
(involuntary manslaughter); § 2903.041 
(reckless homicide); § 2903.05 
(negligent homicide); § 2903.06 
(aggravated vehicular homicide); 
§ 2903.09 (definitions). 
Fertilization Yes 
  
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 652 (West 
2002 & Supp. 2013) (discharging 
firearms and assault and battery); tit. 21, 
§ 691 (West Supp. 2013) (defining an 
“unborn child” as a potential victim of 
homicide); tit. 63, § 1-730 (West 2004 
& Supp. 2013) (definitions). 
Fertilization Partial 
  
Oregon None — — 
  
Pennsylvania 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2603 (West 
1998) (criminal homicide of unborn 
child); § 2604 (murder of unborn child); 
§ 2605 (voluntary manslaughter of 
unborn child); § 2606 (aggravated 
assault of unborn child); § 2608 
(applicability); § 3203 (definitions). 
Fertilization Yes 
  
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (2002) 
(willful killing of unborn quick child). 
Quickening No 
  
South 
Carolina 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1083 (Supp. 
2012) (death or injury of child in utero 
due to commission of violent crime). 
Any stage of 
development 
Yes 
  
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2 (2006) 
(definitions); § 22-16-1 (defining 
“homicide” for purposes of the state’s 
homicide statutes); § 22-16-1.1 (fetal 
homicide); § 22-16-15 (manslaughter); 
§ 22-16-41 (vehicular homicide). 
Fertilization Yes 
  
Tennessee TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-13-107 (Supp. 
2012) (defining embryos and fetuses as 
potential victims for purposes of the 
assault statutes); § 39-13-214 (Supp. 
2013) (defining embryos and fetuses as 
potential victims for purposes of the 
homicide statutes). 
Any stage of 
development 
Yes 
  
  
Texas TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07 (West 
Supp. 2012) (defining “individual” for 
purposes of the entire penal code); 
§ 19.06 (applicability of homicide 
statutes); § 22.12 (applicability of 
assault statutes). 
Fertilization Yes 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
 
State 
 
 
State Authorities Recognizing Fetuses 
as Potential Victims of Violent Crimes 
Gestational Age 
Required 
Maternal 
Exception? 
  
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 
(LexisNexis 2012) (criminal homicide). 
Any stage of 
development 
Partial 
  
Vermont None — — 
  
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.2 (2009) 
(killing a fetus). 
Postembryonic Implied 
  
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 
(West 2009) (manslaughter in the first 
degree). 
Quickening Implied 
  
West Virginia W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-30 
(LexisNexis 2010) (defining embryos 
and fetuses as potential victims of 
certain enumerated crimes of violence). 
Fertilization Yes 
  
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (West 2005) 
(first-degree intentional homicide); 
§ 940.02 (West 2005) (first-degree 
reckless homicide); § 940.03 (West 
2005 & Supp. 2012) (felony murder); 
§ 940.04 (abortion) (West 2005 & Supp. 
2012); § 940.05 (West 2005) (second-
degree intentional homicide); § 940.06 
(second-degree reckless homicide); 
§ 940.08 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) 
(homicide by negligent handling of 
dangerous weapons, explosives, or fire); 
§ 940.09 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) 
(homicide by intoxicated use of vehicle 
or firearm); § 940.10 (2005) (homicide 
by negligent operation of a vehicle); 
§ 940.13 (abortion exception); 
§ 940.195 (battery and aggravated 
battery to an unborn child). 
Conception 
 
Yes for 
abortion; no 
for the rest 
  
Wyoming None — — 
  
 
  
